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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the economic growth and catch-up of the Republic of Korea over the 
past half-century. The gap of output per worker between the Republic of Korea and United 
States has decreased rapidly, as the Republic of Korea’s lower per capita income, relative  
to its potential level, has led to higher growth, confirming the prediction of a conditional 
convergence theory. Cross-country regression further suggests that the Republic of Korea’s 
catch-up to the United States is also attributable to strong investment, lower fertility, greater 
trade openness, and improvements in human resources and rule of law, while improvement 
in democracy tends to slow the pace of the catch-up. Yet as the Republic of Korea catches 
up to the United States and its steady-state level in per worker output, it is subject to growth 
slowdown unless it improves institutions and policy factors. While manufacturing- and 
export-oriented development served the Republic of Korea’s success well, poor productivity 
performance in the services sector has hampered overall productivity growth. The Republic 
of Korea’s experience implies that the People’s Republic of China’s potential growth rates 
are likely to slow in the coming decades due to the convergence effect and with the 
rebalancing toward a domestic consumption and services-based economy. The People’s 
Republic of China needs to upgrade its institutional quality and improve productivity, 
particularly in its services sector, to sustain strong growth. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Republic of Korea has had a remarkable economic performance since the early 
1960s, achieving per capita income of $27,000 to become the world’s eighth-largest 
trading nation.1 However, the economy’s recent growth performance has been rather 
disappointing. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaged only 4.1% during  
2000–2010, marking a significant drop from the average of 7.9% achieved during 
1960–2000. Moreover, from 2011 to 2015, the Republic of Korea’s GDP growth 
averaged only 3.0%. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) (2014a) has projected a further decline in the country’s growth rate to around 
2.0% in the coming decade.  
Some researchers argue that the Republic of Korea’s strong economic performance is 
an outcome of factor accumulation rather than efficiency improvement (e.g., Krugman 
1994), while others attribute the growth largely to “good fundamentals,” including  
a high savings rate, strong human capital, maintenance of good institutions, high  
trade openness, and prudent fiscal and monetary management (e.g., Radelet, Sachs, 
Lee 2001; De Gregorio and Lee 2004). In particular, trade openness, driven by 
outward-looking development strategy, has often been emphasized as a key growth 
factor, as it has provided access to inexpensive imported intermediate goods, larger 
markets, and advanced technologies, thereby contributing to rapid productivity  
growth of the Republic of Korea’s manufacturing industries. The government has  
also played an important role in promoting export-oriented industrialization, as  
export-oriented policies designed to offer performance-based incentives for exporters 
have facilitated continuous upgrading of Republic of Korea firms’ comparative 
advantage in global markets.2  
It is debated whether the Republic of Korea’s current slowdown is an indication of a 
permanent drop in its growth potential. Some scholars believe that the Republic of 
Korea’s economic downturn will be exacerbated, eventually leading to a situation 
comparable to Japan’s “lost decades” (Cho 2014). Others, however, consider that the 
dynamic forces that have enabled the Republic of Korea’s fast growth—in particular 
manufacturing exports—remain vibrant; thus, the Republic of Korea can continue its 
strong growth trajectory aided by appropriate policies (Sharma 2012). 
This study investigates the Republic of Korea’s growth performance and assesses the 
country’s future growth prospects. The changes in the country’s per capita income and 
growth rates over the past 5 decades are discussed and compared with Japan. This 
study also assesses changes in the gap of per worker output between the Republic of 
Korea and United States (US) over time, and analyzes the extent to which the gap is 
explained by differences in factor inputs and total factor productivity (TFP). In addition, 
the study adopts a general framework of cross-country analysis, putting the Republic of 
Korea’s experience in a global context, discussing the major factors that enabled the 
Republic of Korea to achieve strong growth over a half-century yet caused the recent 
growth slowdown. Further, the study adopts more detailed industry-level data of the 
Republic of Korea’s economy to assess the imbalance between the manufacturing and 
1 Gross national income per capita in 2014 is from World Bank (2015).  
2 It remains controversial to what extent industrial policy that targets specific industries has contributed to 
overall economic growth. The developmental state view, such as that of Amsden (1992), argued that 
selective government policies attempted to “pick winners.” In contrast, the World Bank (1993) asserted 
that government intervention conformed to the market, rather than replaced the market, using a 
pragmatic and flexible approach. Lee (1996) showed that targeting specific industries was often harmful 
to productivity growth of the overall economy. 
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services sectors, and compares the Republic of Korea’s sector performance with those 
of the US and Japan. 
Thereafter, the study assesses the implications of the empirical findings from the 
Republic of Korea’s experience for the growth performance and prospects of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
The PRC’s economic performance since the 1980s has been astonishing—its economy 
has grown more than 9.5% annually. However, its economy, too, is now slowing; it 
grew only 6.9% in 2015, the lowest since 1990, and is predicted to grow more slowly in 
the coming years. Considering the PRC’s influence on the world economy, the future of 
its growth is of concern to many. This study analyzes PRC economic growth in the 
context of global standards as well as the Republic of Korea’s experience. It discusses 
the changes in the gap of per worker output between the PRC and US over time and 
compares the performance of the PRC with that of the Republic of Korea for an 
equivalent period. It also suggests policy measures that the PRC could adopt to sustain 
strong growth.3 
2. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND CATCH-UP 
2.1 The Experience of the Republic of Korea 
During the past half-century, the Republic of Korea’s economy has shown impressive 
growth, with average annual GDP growth rate surpassing 7.1%, raising the level of real 
per capita GDP in international prices almost 26 times (Table 1). Average GDP growth 
rates accelerated to 7.5% in the 1960s, 8.6% in the 1970s, and 9.3% in the 1980s, but 
the impressive performance was interrupted by the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. This 
sudden crisis had a devastating effect on the Republic of Korea’s economy, with real 
GDP falling by almost 7.0% in 1998, due to the huge, sudden reversal of short-term 
capital flows triggered by international investor panic (Radelet, Sachs, Lee 2001). 
Structural problems underlying the economy, including undersupervised financial 
systems and an overleveraged corporate sector, also led to the accumulation of 
vulnerabilities that set the stage for the crisis and amplified its shock to the economy.  
The Republic of Korea managed to recover rapidly from 1999—faster than anyone  
had expected. However, there seems to have been a permanent decline in growth 
potential, as the average GDP growth rate remained at 4.1% over 2000–2010.  
The global financial crisis in 2008–2009, which evolved from the US subprime 
mortgage crisis, also seriously affected the Republic of Korea’s economy through 
spillovers from global trade and financial markets. The country’s GDP growth rate 
dropped to 0.3% in 2009. Although the Republic of Korea managed the global financial 
crisis relatively well, showing the fastest recovery among OECD members, its economy 
still has not yet resumed its pre-crisis growth rates.  
  
3 Japan’s experiences, in particular asset bubble burst and long-term stagnation since the early 1990s, 
can be also useful for PRC policy making. However, the PRC’s per capita output, as well as economic 
structure, lags over 40 years behind those of Japan, which makes difficult to compare two economies 
and draw useful policy implications for the PRC. 
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Table 1: Economic Growth in Selected Countries, 1960–2010 
Country 
GDP per Capita Average Annual GDP Growth  
1960 2010 
2010/ 
1960 
1960–
1970 
1970–
1980 
1980–
1990 
1990–
2000 
2000–
2010 
1960–
2010 
Republic of 
Korea 
1,078 27,578 25.59 7.45 
[4.82] 
8.58 
[6.83] 
9.28 
[7.90] 
6.33 
[5.65] 
4.07 
[3.60] 
7.14 
[5.76] 
Japan 4,795 30,916 6.45 9.66 
[8.62] 
4.37 
[3.25] 
4.53 
[4.00] 
1.12 
[0.84] 
0.74 
[0.68] 
4.08 
[3.48] 
United 
States 
15,254 42,371 2.78 4.11 
[2.84] 
3.19 
[2.26] 
3.18 
[2.20] 
3.37 
[2.28] 
1.52 
[0.58] 
3.07 
[2.03] 
People’s 
Republic of 
China 
1,057 8,426 7.97 3.24 
[0.92] 
6.03 
[4.15] 
8.87 
[7.34] 
9.92 
[8.89] 
9.95 
[9.40] 
7.61 
[6.14] 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Note: Per capita GDP levels and growth rates are based on the international prices of 2005 (adjusted for purchasing 
power parity), which are based on the Penn World Table 8.1 in Feenstra, Inklaar, Timmer (2015). 
Source: Feenstra, Inklaar, Timmer (2015). 
Over the past half-century, due to the Republic of Korea’s strong growth performance, 
its economy has experienced a fast catch-up to advanced economies in per capita 
output and income (Figure 1).4 The Republic of Korea has achieved the high-income 
level in a half-century, with per capita income of $27,578 purchasing power parity 
(PPP) in 2010. In 1960, it was still a lower-middle income country, with a per capita 
GDP of only $1,078 PPP.  
Figure 1: Trends in per Capita Gross Domestic Product in Selected Economies  
(purchasing power parity international dollar, 2005 constant prices) 
 
Source: Feenstra, Inklaar, Timmer (2015).  
  
4 For an international and intertemporal comparison, this study uses data on per capita GDP at PPP 
international dollars from the Penn-World Table 8.1 in Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015). 
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Japan has also experienced a significant growth slowdown since early 1990s. The 
burst of asset bubbles in the 1990s left Japan’s financial system and private sector 
saddled with a huge debt overhang. During its “lost decades,” Japan suffered from 
deflation and economic stagnation due to its dysfunctional financial system and lack of 
private demand. Consequently, the gap in per capita GDP between Japan and the 
Republic of Korea has narrowed rapidly, and has been close to zero in recent years.  
In the last 35 years, since Deng Xiaoping embarked on economic opening and reforms, 
the PRC has shown astounding output growth of more than 9.5% annually. It has 
rapidly narrowed its per capita output gap with advanced economies. Yet despite this 
stellar performance, the country’s per capita output continues to lag behind those of 
advanced economies. The GDP per capita in 2011 was $8,850 PPP, which is 
comparable to the Republic of Korea’s 1988 level (i.e., $9,137 PPP) and Japan’s 1968 
level (i.e., $9,527 PPP). The PRC is thus more than 20 years behind the Republic of 
Korea and more than 40 years behind Japan.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of per capita GDP levels of the three Asian economies 
relative to the US over time. The values are 5-year averages, matched with average 
GDP growth rates in the corresponding period.5 The Republic of Korea’s sustained 
growth contributed to narrowing the gap in its per capita GDP with the US, as it 
experienced a very rapid catch-up to the US in per capita output. The value of per 
capita output increased from approximately 10% of the US value in 1960 to more than 
60% in the late 2000s.  
Figure 2 shows that the pace of the catch-up slowed as the Republic of Korea 
economy narrowed its per capita income gap compared to that of the US. While 
income per capita in the Republic of Korea was less than 20% of the US average in the 
1970s and 1980s, annual per capita GDP growth reached only 7%–8%. By the time the 
Republic of Korea reached 50% of US per capita income in 2000, its annual growth 
rate had slowed to 3%–4%.  
The Republic of Korea experience resembles that of Japan. Japan’s annual per capita 
GDP growth dropped from 8.6% in the 1960s to 3%–4% in the 1970s and 1980s as its 
per capita income jumped from about 40% to over 60% of the US level over the period 
(Figure 2). 
The evolution of per capita income and growth rates over time can be explained by the 
conditional convergence theory. Conditional convergence of per capita (or per worker) 
output is predicted by an extended version of the neoclassical growth model, as 
described by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). A country with a low initial per capita 
output relative to its own long-run (or steady-state) potential level of per capita output 
grows faster than a country with a higher level of per capita output. The basic concept 
is that the farther a country is located from its steady-state output or income level, the 
greater the gap of reproducible physical and human capital stock and productivity (i.e., 
technology) from its long-run levels. The gap of existing physical and human capital 
from steady-state levels offers the chance for a rapid catch-up via high rates of physical 
and human capital accumulation, which are encouraged by higher rates of return on 
investment. In addition, the greater technology gap stimulates faster productivity 
improvement via the diffusion or imitation of technology from more technologically 
advanced economies. Therefore, the lower the initial level of per capita output relative 
to the steady state, the higher the subsequent growth.  
5 The underlying data are the adjusted PPP values from the Penn-World Table 8.1 in Feenstra, Inklaar, 
and Timmer (2015). For 2012, 2013, and 2014, the values are estimated from information on real GDP 
growth rates from IMF (2015).  
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Figure 2: Per Capita Income Level and Growth Rates of the People’s Republic  
of China, Republic of Korea, and Japan Relative to the United States 
 
GDP = gross domestic product, US = United States. 
Note: The figure shows the period average of relative per capita income and its growth rates over the corresponding  
5 years. For 5-year periods, 60 indicates 1960–1964, …, and 10 indicates 2010–2014. The data from 2012 to 2015 are 
from IMF (2015).  
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Feenstra, Inklaar, Timmer (2015) and IMF (2015).  
2.2 Catch-Up and Convergence in Output and Productivity  
This subsection assesses the role of factor accumulation and productivity increase in 
the evolutionary process of the gap in income between two countries. The aggregate 
production function is used, and the level of per worker output is decomposed into 
productive inputs, including physical and human capital, and TFP based on the 
development accounting approach (Hall and Jones 1999).6  
A simple Cobb–Douglas production function is assumed:  
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾(1−𝛼)(ℎ𝐿)𝛼,  (1) 
where Y is value-added output (GDP), K is physical capital, L is the number of workers, 
h is human capital per worker, and A is TFP. The labor share of output is given by α, 
which varies across countries and over time.  
At the per worker level, the production function can be written as 
𝑦 = 𝐴𝑘(1−𝛼)ℎ𝛼, (2) 
To assess how much of the gap in y is explained by differences in the two productive 
inputs, k and h, and in the TFP, the ratio of per worker output between two countries,  
i and j, is expressed as 
6 Lee (2005) adopted the same methodology to analyze the Republic of Korea’s catch-up process over 
1970–2000. 
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yi/yj = (kı�/kȷ� )(hı�/hȷ� )(Ai/Aj), (3) 
where 𝑘� = 𝑘(1−𝛼) , ℎ�  = ℎ𝛼. 
Equation (3) enables the decomposition of the differences in per worker GDP between 
two countries into the differences in the physical capital–labor ratio, human capital per 
unit of labor, and TFP. Note that this framework relies on several simplifying 
assumptions. The estimate of TFP, which is an unobservable “residual,” may 
incorporate many elements other than productivity, such as natural resources and 
business cycle factors. The distinction between factor accumulation and technology 
(i.e., productivity) increase is often ambiguous, because A, k, and h are not 
independent of each other.  
The US is considered a reference country (j) in equation (3). Thus, the value of each 
term in equation (3) indicates the level of per worker output, physical capital per 
worker, human capital per worker, and TFP of the Republic of Korea (i) relative to that 
of the US.  
To conduct the decomposition of output, data on GDP and physical capital stock are 
collected from the Penn-World Table 8.1 (Feenstra, Inklaar, Timmer 2015). Labor 
shares are assumed to be 0.6 across countries and over time. The working-age 
population, sourced from the United Nations (2015), is used as a measure for the 
number of workers. The available cross-country sources of labor force or employees 
are less reliable than those of the working-age population.  
Human capital per worker is measured by the sum of the shares of workers across all 
education categories weighted by their relevant productivity, measured by relative 
wage rates (Barro and Lee 2015). The relative wage rate of a worker with schooling is 
calculated by assuming a constant marginal return rate to an additional year of 
schooling of 10%, which is the world average (Psacharopoulos 1994). 
Table 2 presents the evolution of the gap in per worker output between the Republic  
of Korea and US over time, while assessing the sources of the Republic of Korea’s 
catch-up to the US. The Republic of Korea experienced a very rapid catch-up in per 
worker output over time. The value of per worker output increased from 8% of the US 
value in 1960 to 61% in 2010. The output catch-up process is associated with strong 
catch-up in physical and human capital accumulation and TFP. Physical capital shows 
the fastest expansion: the level of physical capital stock per worker in the Republic of 
Korea relative to that of the US increased tremendously from 7% in 1960 to 78% in 
2010. This contrasts with the increase in the relative levels of human capital per worker 
from 60% to 97%, and TFP from 31% to 68% over the same period. 
In addition, Table 2 shows that the pace of productivity catch-up slowed during  
2000–2010. Indeed, the relative level of productivity decreased, although only 
marginally from 70% to 68% during this period. Note that this could have been caused 
by not only the slowdown of the Republic of Korea’s productivity growth, but also the 
relatively high growth rates of productivity of the US economy in the early 2000s. 
Table 2 also details the sources of Japan’s catch-up in per worker output over time. For 
example, in 1960, the value of per worker output in Japan was only 29% of the value in 
the US, but rose to 78% in 2010. As in the Republic of Korea, in Japan, physical capital 
accumulation showed the fastest growth in this catch-up process. The level of physical 
capital stock per worker in Japan relative to that of the US increased from 17% in 1970 
to 115% in 2010, contrasting with a moderate increase in the level of productivity from 
66% to 78% of the US over the same period. Yet the pace of Japan’s catch-up in per 
worker output has slowed since 1990. The level of per worker output in Japan relative 
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to the US increased only marginally from 73% in 1990 to 78% in 2010, probably due to 
the decline in productivity. The relative level of productivity in Japan deteriorated from 
90% in 1990 to 80% in 2000 and further to 78% in 2010. By contrast, the relative levels 
of physical capital stock and human capital stock per worker continued to increase over 
the same period.  
Table 2: Output per Worker and Its Components: Ratio to United States Values,  
1960–2010 
Country Year 
Per Worker 
Output 
Physical Capital 
per Worker 
Human 
Capital per 
Worker 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
Republic of 
Korea 
1960 0.08 0.07 0.60 0.31 
1970 0.11 0.10 0.64 0.38 
1980 0.20 0.15 0.69 0.53 
1990 0.33 0.24 0.81 0.67 
2000 0.47 0.45 0.88 0.70 
2010 0.61 0.78 0.97 0.68 
Japan 1960 0.29 0.17 0.83 0.66 
1970 0.50 0.37 0.75 0.88 
1980 0.69 0.69 0.76 0.93 
1990 0.73 0.78 0.83 0.90 
2000 0.74 1.03 0.87 0.80 
2010 0.78 1.15 0.92 0.78 
People’s 
Republic of 
China 
1960 0.07 0.02 0.50 0.47 
1970 0.06 0.02 0.50 0.39 
1980 0.06 0.03 0.52 0.37 
1990 0.07 0.04 0.54 0.35 
2000 0.09 0.09 0.59 0.34 
2010 0.17 0.20 0.61 0.44 
Notes: Data on output and physical capital stock are sourced from Feenstra, Inklaar, Timmer (2015), and data on the 
working-age population are sourced from the United Nations (2013). Human capital per worker is measured by the 
weighted sum of the shares of workers multiplied by the relative wage rates across all education categories. Relative 
wage rates are constructed assuming that the rates of return to an additional schooling year are constant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
In addition, Table 2 shows that there is a significant difference in the levels of per 
worker output between the PRC and the three advanced economies in the study. In 
2010, the value of per worker output in the PRC was only 17% of that value in the US, 
comparable to the Republic of Korea’s 1980 level (i.e., 20%).7 The PRC’s physical 
capital stock per worker level (20%) in 2010 relative to the US level is comparable to 
the Republic of Korea’s level in the 1980s. The PRC’s relative productivity level (44%) 
in 2010 is lower than that of the Republic of Korea in 1980. 
Equation (3) can be transformed by taking logs to express the log difference in per 
worker output of the Republic of Korea with the US as an additive sum of three 
components: 
7 Considering that the PRC has grown much faster that the US over the past 5 years, the value of per 
worker output in the PRC in 2015 is estimated to be approximately 23% of that value in the US. Note 
that the gap in per worker output of the PRC with US is much larger than that in per capita output, 
because the PRC has a larger share of workers in total population than the US. 
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ln �yUS
yK
� = ln �kUS������
kK����
� + ln �hUS������
hK����
� + ln (AUS
AK
) (4) 
Figure 3 shows the gap of per worker output and its sources at 10-year intervals from 
1960 to 2010. In 1960, US per worker output was about 12.5 times the Republic of 
Korea’s per worker output, which are decomposed into differences in per worker 
capital, human capital, and TFP. 
Figure 3: Change in the Gap of per Worker Output and Its Components  
between the Republic of Korea and the United States, 1960–2010  
 
Note: The gap is expressed as the log difference in the value of each term between the United States and the Republic 
of Korea. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on equation (4). 
The income gap between the Republic of Korea and US continued to decrease over 
the past half-century. Over time, the gaps in physical capital and human capital per 
worker also decreased rapidly. By contrast, the productivity gap decreased only until 
2000 and then has increased. Currently, the productivity gap is the principal source of 
the income gap. If the Republic of Korea’s productivity level is upgraded from the 
current 64% to 80% of that of the US, the Republic of Korea’s per worker output would 
jump to 76% of that of the US, with gaps in the relative levels of physical capital and 
human capital per worker in 2010. 
The results of development accounting explain that the Republic of Korea requires 
productivity improvement to further catch up to the US. During the Republic of Korea’s 
fast catch-up phase of development, factor accumulation played an important role. 
Consequently, the Republic of Korea now faces a much smaller gap in physical and 
human capital stock from both its long-run potential and US levels. Thus, according  
to the prediction of conditional convergence, the Republic of Korea economy will 
experience slower factor accumulation than it did in previous decades.  
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In terms of physical capital accumulation, the Republic of Korea has maintained very 
high investment rates throughout its catch-up process. The real investment–real GDP 
ratio continued to increase over time, from 10% of GDP in the early 1960s to close to 
40% during the 1990s prior to the Asian financial crisis (Figure 4). The ratio dropped 
significantly during the crisis, recovered gradually to 35%, and then declined again. 
Figure 4: Investment Rates of the People’s Republic of China, Japan,  
Republic of Korea, and United States, 1960–2014 
 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Source: Feenstra, Inklaar, Timmer (2015).  
The low investment rates relative to the pre-crisis level may suggest a permanent 
negative occurrence. 8  The rate of return of capital declined, as indicated by the 
Republic of Korea’s low real interest rate. The permanent depression of investment 
would have negative consequences for the Republic of Korea economy’s  
catch-up pace. 
In addition, Figure 4 depicts investment rates for Japan and the PRC. Japan’s 
investment rates increased to 40% in 1973, prior to the oil shock that began in the 
same year. In recent years, this has slowed to 20%. The PRC’s investment rates 
continued to increase gradually over the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and more rapidly 
from the early 1990s. The PRC currently invests almost 50% of its GDP, which is 
disproportionate compared to the historical experiences of Japan and the Republic  
of Korea.  
Concerning the accumulation of human capital, the Republic of Korea’s performance 
has been remarkable. Figure 5 shows that education expanded significantly over the 
past half-century. The number of average years of schooling increased from only  
4.1 years in 1960 to 12.0 years in 2010. As a result, the gap in the average educational 
attainment between the Republic of Korea and US narrowed substantially. The 
Republic of Korea’s dramatic catch-up reflects the rapid increase in school enrollment 
8 Barro and Lee (2003) suggested that, based on broad international evidence, a financial crisis typically 
has a persistent adverse effect on investment. In addition, they found that the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis has had a long-term negative impact on investment in the Republic of Korea’s economy. 
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rates for all education levels. Considering that enrollment ratios at secondary and 
tertiary levels will not increase much beyond current levels—which are among the 
highest in the world—the speed of the Republic of Korea’s human capital accumulation 
will eventually decelerate.9  
Figure 5: Trends of Average Schooling Years of Total Population  
Aged 15 Years and Over, 1960–2010 
 
Source: Barro and Lee (2013). 
3. DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA’S CATCH-UP 
3.1 Cross-Country Analyses of Economic Growth 
This section applies the framework of cross-country analyses of economic growth to 
investigate the major factors that explain the Republic of Korea’s growth and catch-up 
experience over the past half-century.  
The conditional convergence theory implies that each country has its own steady-state 
levels of per worker output to which it is converging.  
The basic framework is expressed as 
𝐷𝑦𝑖𝑡 = f(𝑦𝑖𝑡 ,  𝑦𝑖*)  (5) 
where 𝐷𝑦𝑖𝑡 is country i’s per worker GDP growth rate in period t, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the country’s per 
worker output, and 𝑦𝑖∗  its own long-run (or steady-state) level of y. 𝐷𝑦𝑖𝑡  is inversely 
related to y, indicating conditional convergence of per worker output to its own  
9 The number of average years of schooling does not take into account the differences in the quality of 
schooling and measurement of skills obtained on the job. Thus, the Republic of Korea could continue to 
improve the quality of its human resources to catch up to the US. See the discussion of educational 
quality and adult skills in Barro and Lee (2015). 
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steady-state level over time. In the cross-country context, countries with higher per 
worker output would grow slower than those with lower per worker output when 
controlling for the variables influencing the steady-state level. Consistent with the 
production function, the dependent variable is expressed as the growth in per worker 
output rather than per capita output. Note that the per capita output growth rate is 
calculated by the per worker output growth rate added to the growth rate of the share of 
the working-age population to the total population. 
The long-term level of per worker output depends on various external environmental 
and policy variables. In the extended neoclassical growth model, the steady-state  
level of per worker output is determined by investment rate, population growth, and 
human capital (Mankiw, Romer, Weil 1992). Previous theoretical and empirical studies 
consider institutions and policy factors as other important determinants of long-run per 
worker output. These factors include government consumption, institutional quality, 
macroeconomic stability, trade openness to the world economy, and democracy (Barro 
and Lee 1994, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). 
The empirical framework can be represented by a reduced form, such as10 
𝐷𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 log�𝑦𝑖,𝑡� + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (6) 
where Xi denotes an array of the variables that influence country i's steady-state level 
of per worker output.  
The regression of equation (6) applies to a panel set of cross-country data for  
75 countries over 10 5-year periods from 1960 to 2010: 1960–1965, 1965–1970,  
1970–1975, 1975–1980, 1980–1985, 1985–1990, 1990–1995, 1995–2000, 2000–2005, 
and 2005–2010. The panel is unbalanced, with 713 observations in total. This system 
of 10 equations is estimated by adopting instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
techniques to control for the endogeneity of explanatory variables. Instruments are 
mostly lagged values of the explanatory variables. The estimation results from the IV 
panel estimation with and without country-fixed effects are presented. The exclusion of 
country-fixed effects can cause bias of the estimates; however, the fixed-effects 
technique eliminates information from cross-section variations and could exacerbate 
measurement errors, especially if the timing of relationships is not known (Barro and 
Lee 2015). 
The representative set of the explanatory variables, Xi, includes investment, fertility, 
and human capital as fundamental growth factors. The stock of human capital is 
measured by the average years of schooling for the population aged 15–64 years. In 
addition, the regression includes the reciprocal of life expectancy at birth as a measure 
of the health of workers in an economy. Five other variables are included to control for 
institution and policy variables: government consumption, overall maintenance of the 
rule of law, inflation rate, trade openness, and democracy. A measure for changes in 
the terms of trade is included as an exogenous factor.11 In addition, the regressions 
include period dummies to control for common shocks to per worker GDP growth in  
all countries. 
Summary statistics of the variables for 1965–1970 and 2005–2010 for the Republic of 
Korea, Japan, PRC, US, and the world are presented in the Appendix. 
10 The specification and data follow those of Barro and Lee (2015), with the updated national accounts 
data from the Penn World Table 8.1 in Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015).  
11 A measure of financial crisis was also considered as an independent variable, but it is statistically 
insignificant. As discussed in footnote 9, the impact of financial crisis on growth can occur through its 
adverse effect on investment.  
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Table 3: Cross-Country Panel Regressions for per Worker  
Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate 
Regression (1) (2) 
Log (per worker GDP) –0.0230*** –0.0343*** 
 (0.00236) (0.00352) 
Investment/GDP 0.0364** 0.0353* 
 (0.0162) (0.0208) 
Log (total fertility rate) –0.0246*** –0.0185*** 
 (0.00445) (0.00622) 
Average years of schooling –0.00352* –0.00552** 
 (0.00183) (0.00243) 
Average years of schooling squared 0.000292** 0.000365** 
 (0.000122) (0.000158) 
1/Life expectancy –3.275*** –2.157** 
 (0.662) (0.990) 
Trade openness 0.00616** 0.00702 
 (0.00302) (0.00601) 
Government consumption/GDP –0.00954 –0.00697 
 (0.0127) (0.0153) 
Rule of law index 0.0184*** 0.0115 
 (0.00572) (0.00806) 
Inflation rate –0.0163* –0.0272** 
 (0.00942) (0.0132) 
Democracy index 0.0402** 0.0249 
 (0.0181) (0.0224) 
Democracy index squared –0.0380** –0.0200 
 (0.0164) (0.0203) 
Growth rate of terms of trade 0.0665** 0.0588** 
 (0.0262) (0.0264) 
Country fixed effect no yes 
Period dummies yes yes 
No. of economies, observations 75, 713 75. 713 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Notes:  
1.  The system has 10 equations, corresponding to 1960–1965, 1965–1970, 1970–1975, 1975–1980, 1980–1985, 
1985–1990, 1990–1995, 1995–2000, 2000–2005, and 2005–2010. The sample consists of 75 economies. The 
system is estimated by adopting instrumental variable (IV) estimation techniques. Instruments are mostly lagged 
values of the explanatory variables. The dependent variables are the growth rates of per worker GDP.  
2.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
3.  The specification and data closely follow those in Barro and Lee (2015), but use the updated national accounts data 
from the Penn-World Table 8.1 in Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015).  
4.  Per worker GDP levels and growth rates are based on 2005 international prices (adjusted for purchasing power 
parity).  
5.  The investment ratio is the ratio of real investment (private plus public) to real GDP.  
6.  The government consumption measure is the ratio of real government consumption to real GDP, based on the 
Penn-World Table 8.1. They are averaged over the period.  
7.  Schooling data are the average years of schooling for the population aged 15–64 years from Barro and Lee (2013).  
8.  Life expectancy at birth and the fertility rate are from World Bank (2015).  
9.  The rule of law index, expressed on a 0–1 scale, with 1 being the most favorable, is based on the maintenance of 
the rule of law index in PRS Group (2015).  
10.  The inflation rate is the growth rate over each period of a consumer price index.  
11.  The trade openness variable is the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP.  
12.  The democracy index, expressed on a 0–1 scale, with 1 being the most favorable, is based on the indicator of 
political rights compiled by Freedom House (2015).  
13.  The growth rate of the terms of trade is the change of export prices to import prices over the period.  
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Column 1 of Table 3 presents the regression results of equation (6) without  
country-fixed effects. The negative estimate of the coefficient on the first explanatory 
variable, the log of per worker GDP at the start of each period, reveals a strong 
conditional convergence effect. The estimated speed of conditional convergence is 
about 2.3% per year, implying that a country at half of the per worker output level of 
another country tends to grow by 1.6 percentage points (= 2.3 x ln(2)) faster than the 
richer country, assuming the same level of long-term per worker output. 
The investment rate has a positive and statistically significant effect on growth. The log 
of the total fertility rate is significantly negative. The estimated coefficient on the 
reciprocal of life expectancy at birth is negative and highly significant, indicating that 
better health is associated with higher economic growth. 
The regression result shows the nonlinear relationship between human capital stock 
and growth, as discussed in Barro and Lee (2015). The coefficients on average years 
of schooling and its square term are negative and positive, respectively, although only 
the square term is marginally statistically significant. The pattern of the coefficients 
demonstrates that the growth rate increases with the level of educational attainment 
only when the society has attained 6.0 average years of schooling. Hence, only 
countries that have accumulated human capital above a certain threshold are able to 
experience higher GDP growth induced by an increase in educational attainment for 
given values of the other explanatory variables.  
The regression results show that government policies and institutions play a significant 
role in determining economic growth. A subjective measure of the extent of 
maintenance of the rule of law is significantly positive. Increased openness to 
international trade is a positive determinant for growth, although the estimated 
coefficient is marginally significant.  
The level of democracy has a nonlinear relationship with growth, as found by Barro 
(1996). The coefficients on the indicator of democracy and its square term are positive 
and negative, respectively, and both coefficients are jointly statistically significant. The 
pattern of the coefficients on the indicator of democracy and its square term indicates 
that the GDP growth rate increases with political freedom at low levels of democracy 
but decreases with democracy once the society has attained a certain level of political 
freedom. The threshold level is 0.53. The nonlinear relation suggests that autocracy 
can have negative effects on growth if a leader uses his or her power to steal the 
nation's wealth, but more democracy above the threshold level can also retard growth if 
it promotes income-redistributive policies, rather than pro-growth ones, in systems of 
majority voting. 
Inflation, an indicator of macroeconomic instability, has a negative effect on growth,  
but the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. The government 
consumption–GDP ratio is statistically insignificant. A higher growth rate of the terms of 
trade (i.e., export prices relative to import prices) has a strong, positive effect on 
economic growth.  
In summary, the regression results in column 1 show that per capita GDP growth has 
strong relationships with the initial per capita GDP level, investment, fertility, the quality 
of human resources, rule of law maintenance, trade openness, and democracy. 
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Column 2 of Table 3 adds country-fixed effects. The results are similar to those of 
column 1. The estimated coefficient on the log of per worker GDP remains statistically 
significant. The estimated speed of conditional convergence increases to about 3.4% 
per year. Since the unobserved country-specific factors that influence the steady-state 
value of per worker output are likely to have positive relationships with current per 
worker GDP, the omitted variables tend to bias upward the estimated effect of lagged 
per worker GDP on growth. Consequently, the inclusion of the country-fixed effects 
tends to lower the convergence rate below zero. 
The results with country-fixed effects show that some economic policy and institutional 
factors, such as rule of law and trade openness, become statistically insignificant. In 
contrast, the estimated coefficient on inflation becomes statistically significant. 
3.2 The Republic of Korea’s Economic Growth  
in Comparative Perspective  
The growth regressions imply that the Republic of Korea has grown faster than  
high-income countries by many factors, including convergence, due to the low level of 
per worker output relative to its long-term level as well as favorable environmental and 
policy factors influencing the long-term potential level of per worker output, 𝑦𝑖∗, to which 
the Republic of Korea has been converging.  
The Republic of Korea’s relatively favorable environment and policy factors have 
facilitated faster catch-up to the advanced economies than other developing countries 
with the same level of per worker output over the transition to a higher steady-state 
level of per worker output. Note that these factors could affect both the rate of factor 
accumulation and of productivity growth. 
The cross-country regression results allow analysis of the growth performance of the 
Republic of Korea relative to that of the US. The point estimates of the parameters in 
the regressions of Table 3 are used for simple accounting that breaks down the fitted 
values of growth rates for each country into the contributions from each explanatory 
variable. Although the residual errors in individual country growth rates are substantial, 
it is worthwhile to examine the differences in the explanatory variables that generate 
the differences in the fitted growth rates. The accounting results can be used to explore 
the sources of the differences in the fitted growth rates between the Republic of Korea 
and US.12  
Table 4 presents the results of the accounting exercise in this study. The basic 
regression can account for a substantial part of the growth differences between the 
Republic of Korea and US over time. The predicted growth rates of the Republic of 
Korea are higher than those of the US over the period. Growth rate differentials  
are shown by the averages over three subperiods: 1960–1980, 1980–2000, and  
2000–2010. The results in panel A of Table 4 are based on the estimates in column (1) 
of Table 3; the estimated growth rate differentials are 2.0, 2.6, and 3.1 percentage 
points for each subperiod, while the actual differences are 4.0, 3.9, and 2.9 percentage 
points. Therefore, the model underestimates the Republic of Korea’s relative growth 
performance in the earlier subperiods.  
12 Using the same technique, De Gregorio and Lee (2004) compared the economic performance of East 
Asian economies relative to those in Latin America, and showed that the better growth performance  
of East Asia is largely attributable to “fundamental growth factors,” including high savings rates,  
strong human capital, high trade openness, maintenance of good institutions, and prudent fiscal and 
monetary management. 
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Table 4: Contributions to Growth Differentials between the Republic of Korea  
and United States, 1960–1980, 1980–2000, and 2000–2010  
(%, annual average) 
 1960–1980 1980–2000 2000–2010 (2000–2010) 
Without Country-Fixed Effects (A) 
Difference in     
Actual growth 0.0395 0.0387 0.0294  
Predicted growth 0.0195 0.0259 0.0309 (100.0%) 
Initial income 0.0484 0.0294 0.0165 (53.3%) 
Investment rate 0.0023 0.0046 0.0041 (13.2%) 
Fertility –0.0122 0.0022 0.0132 (42.8%) 
Schooling –0.0070 –0.0070 -0.0030 (–9.6%) 
Life expectancy –0.0070 –0.0028 0.0004 (1.3%) 
Government consumption –0.000029 –0.000023 –0.000189 (–0.6%) 
Rule of law –0.0092 –0.0082 –0.0021 (–7.0%) 
Inflation rate –0.0014 –0.0003 –0.0001 (–0.4%) 
Democracy 0.0069 0.0062 0.0021 (6.6%) 
Openness 0.0010 0.0019 0.0023 (7.3%) 
Terms of trade 0.000002 –0.0002 –0.0022 (–7.0%) 
With Country-Fixed Effects (B) 
Difference in     
Actual growth 0.0395 0.0387 0.0294  
Predicted growth 0.0501 0.0402 0.0356 (100.0%) 
Initial income 0.0721 0.0439 0.0245 (68.9%) 
Investment rate 0.0023 0.0045 0.0040 (11.1%) 
Fertility –0.0092 0.0017 0.0099 (27.8%) 
Schooling –0.0044 –0.0062 –0.0029 (–8.0%) 
Life expectancy –0.0046 –0.0018 0.0003 (0.7%) 
Government consumption –0.00002 –0.00002 –0.00014 (–0.4%) 
Rule of law –0.0058 –0.0051 –0.0013 (–3.8%) 
Inflation rate –0.0024 –0.0005 –0.0002 (–0.6%) 
Democracy 0.0016 0.0020 0.0008 (2.3%) 
Openness 0.0012 0.0022 0.0026 (7.3%) 
Terms of trade 0.000002 –0.0002 –0.0019 (–5.4%) 
Note: The predicted per capita growth rates in panels A and B are based on the estimation results of columns (1) and 
(2) in Table 3, respectively.  
The cross-country regressions represent the “average” relationships applied to all 
countries across time. Some individual countries undoubtedly differ in terms of the 
magnitude of the relationships, and in terms of the list of the most important variables 
affecting growth. The accounting result indicates that while the basic set of explanatory 
variables explains most of the differences in growth rates between the Republic of 
Korea and US, there are other unexplained factors that made the Republic of Korea 
grow faster than other countries in the sample, in particular, in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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The accounting exercise in Table 4 breaks down the predicted differences separately 
into the contributions from the 11 explanatory variables. The result shows that  
the lower income level of the Republic of Korea compared to that of the US led to 
higher growth over the whole period because of the convergence effect. However,  
the magnitude of the convergence effect became smaller over time as the Republic  
of Korea caught up to the US in per capita income: this effect declined from  
4.8 percentage points a year over 1970–1990 to 2.9 percentage points a year in  
1980–2000, and then 1.7 percentage points a year in 2000–2010.  
While the convergence effect is an important factor explaining the Republic of Korea’s 
growth performance, the rest of the explanatory variables also influenced a significant 
part of the growth difference. For example, during 2000–2010, the model predicts  
an average growth rate for the Republic of Korea that is 3.1 percentage points per  
year higher than that of the US. The convergence effect explains a difference of  
1.7 percentage points, while the rest of the factors influencing growth explain the 
remainder (1.4 percentage points).  
The exercise shows that higher investment rates in the Republic of Korea explain about 
0.2−0.5 percentage points, and trade openness accounts for about 0.1−0.2 percentage 
points in growth differentials over the whole period. The gap between the Republic of 
Korea and US in terms of human resources (i.e., schooling and life expectancy) 
contributes to lowering the growth of the Republic of Korea relative to that of the  
US by 1.4 percentage points over 1960–1980. However, as the Republic of Korea 
experienced improvements in human resources, the human resources variables 
explain a smaller difference of 0.3 percentage points in 2000–2010.  
In addition, the Republic of Korea has improved institutional quality, which has 
contributed positively to growth. The relatively low level of the rule of law variable 
accounts for about 0.8−0.9 percentage points of slower growth of the Republic of Korea 
relative to US over 1960–2000. However, this drops to only 0.2 percentage points  
in 2000–2010. The Appendix shows the values of the variables in 1965–1970 and 
2005–2010 for the Republic of Korea and US. The Republic of Korea has caught up 
rapidly to the US in human resources, policy, and institutional variables from 1970  
to 2010.  
The Republic of Korea had higher fertility rates in earlier periods, but now has lower 
fertility rates than the US. The change in the fertility gap between the Republic of Korea 
and US is predicted to contribute positively to the higher growth of the Republic of 
Korea with a net effect of 1.3 percentage points over 2000–2010. Note that the 
estimated positive effect of fertility is applied to per worker GDP growth rates rather 
than per capita GDP growth rates. While the decrease in fertility has a positive effect 
on per worker (or per capita) output growth by lowering population growth and raising 
the steady-state per worker output, it eventually has a negative effect on per capita 
output growth when it leads to a decline in the working-age population. 
An interesting prediction is that improvement in democracy contributes negatively to 
the catch-up in recent decades in the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea’s level 
of democracy indicator is slightly lower than the critical level of 0.53 in the 1970s and 
then increases above the critical level in 1989 (0.533). Thereafter, the nonlinear 
relationship between democracy and growth works unfavorably for the Republic of 
Korea’s catch-up to the US in per capita income. 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the predicted growth rates that are based on the estimates 
in column 2 of Table 3. The estimated growth rate differentials are 5.0, 4.0, and  
3.6 percentage points for each subperiod. Therefore, the model overestimates the 
Republic of Korea’s actual growth rate differentials in all subperiods. The effect of  
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the difference of per worker output levels between the two countries on subsequent 
growth differentials becomes much larger in panel B than in panel A due to the larger 
convergence estimate. The predicted effects of the differences in other environment 
and policy variables—human resources, investment, fertility, rule of law, inflation, 
democracy, and trade openness—on growth differentials between the Republic of 
Korea and US are broadly similar to those in panel A. 
For the Republic of Korea, the ratio of the working-age population to total population is 
expected to decline from 73.1% in 2010 to 70.6% in 2020, and further to 62.3% in 2030 
(United Nations 2013). The decline in the working-age population ratio has additional 
negative effects on per capita GDP growth of −0.3% in 2010–2020 and −1.3% in  
2020–2030 (Table 5).  
Table 5: Population and Working-Age Population Growth for the People’s 
Republic of China, Japan, Republic of Korea, and United States 
(per year, %) 
Country Growth 
1960–
1970 
1970–
1980 
1980–
1990 
1990–
2000 
2000–
2010 
2010–
2020 
2020–
2030 
2030–
2040 
Republic of 
Korea 
GRp 2.63 1.75 1.38 0.68 0.47 0.57 0.39 –0.19 
GRw 2.12 3.07 2.47 1.00 0.66 0.22 –0.87 –0.95 
GRw–GRp –0.51 1.31 1.09 0.33 0.19 –0.35 –1.26 –0.76 
Japan GRp 1.03 1.11 0.53 0.28 0.07 –0.12 –0.41 –0.51 
GRw 1.86 0.90 0.87 0.06 –0.54 –0.93 –0.70 –1.23 
GRw–GRp 0.82 –0.21 0.34 –0.22 –0.6 –0.81 –0.29 –0.72 
United 
States 
GRp 1.27 0.93 0.97 1.09 0.94 0.73 0.64 0.49 
GRw 1.50 1.57 0.97 1.18 1.05 0.31 0.05 0.41 
GRw–GRp 0.24 0.64 –0.01 0.09 0.11 –0.43 –0.59 –0.09 
People’s 
Republic of 
China 
GRp 2.32 1.88 1.53 1.03 0.56 0.62 0.09 –0.15 
GRw 2.14 2.54 2.56 1.34 1.45 –0.07 –0.31 –1.06 
GRw–GRp –0.18 0.66 1.03 0.31 0.89 –0.69 –0.40 –0.91 
GRp = population growth, GRw = working-age population growth. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the United Nations (2013).  
Overall, the Republic of Korea’s historical experience of economic growth and catch-up 
to the US is largely attributed to the Republic of Korea’s favorable growth factors. 
Relatively low per worker output level, high investment rate, strong human capital, high 
trade openness, maintenance of good institutions, and low inflation have contributed to 
strong growth. Since the Republic of Korea’s rapidly growing economy has continued 
to narrow the gap with the US in per capita income and levels of environmental and 
institutional variables, it has inevitably encountered a slowdown in growth potential. 
4. SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
The Republic of Korea’s remarkable economic transformation since the early 1960s 
has been characterized by fast industrialization and strong economic growth, with  
the manufacturing sector being a key growth driver. In the early 1960s, the Republic  
of Korea shifted its economic policy focus from import substitution to export  
orientation, to support industrialization and economic growth. Export-oriented policies, 
designed to provide incentives to export firms based on their performance, were 
effective in pushing the pace of change in comparative advantage. The exposure to 
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international export markets and performance-based government support stimulated 
efficiency improvement and faster productivity growth in manufacturing industries, 
which successfully underwent diversification stages. The numbers of goods produced 
expanded along with quality upgrades of existing products. Exporters were able  
to build up their comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing and then  
to move to more capital- and technology-intensive industries, including electronics, 
machinery, automobiles, ships, chemicals, and information and communications 
technology products. 
Overall, the Republic of Korea’s export-oriented growth strategy has worked in its 
favor, enabling the country to sustain strong growth and transform into a more 
technologically advanced economy. However, the strategy has also made the country 
vulnerable to external shocks. The Republic of Korea economy came to rely 
increasingly on external demand to drive growth. Exports accounted for about 56% of 
GDP in 2014 from 15% in 1970 and 34% in 2002. As during the global financial crisis, 
overreliance on external demand has made the Republic of Korea susceptible to the 
economic recession in industrial countries as well as drop in global demand. 
An imbalance between the Republic of Korea’s manufacturing and services sectors is 
another outcome of its export-promotion strategy that encouraged more investment in 
manufacturing than in services. Despite the size of the Republic of Korea’s services 
sector, which employs 76% of the country’s workers, the sector’s contribution to overall 
economic growth is small, owing to its low productivity. Value added per worker in the 
services sector remains just 48% of that in the manufacturing sector. Table 6 shows 
value added per worker for nine sectors, including four services industries for the 
Republic of Korea, Japan, PRC, and US in 2010.  
Within the services sector, the levels of labor productivity across services industries are 
diverse. In general, labor productivity is relatively high in the transport, storage, and 
communications industry and the finance, insurance, real estate, and business services 
industry (Table 6). In contrast, the wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and restaurants 
industry has shown a lower productivity level relative to the manufacturing sector. It is 
notable that the finance, real estate, and business services industry had higher labor 
productivity than the manufacturing sector in Japan, US, and PRC, but had lower 
productivity in the Republic of Korea in 2010.  
The annual labor productivity growth in the services sector was only 1.6%, which is 
significantly lower than that in the manufacturing sector of 7.7% for 1980–2010 
(Table 7) The average annual growth in per worker value added dropped from 2.5% 
during 1980–1990 to an annual average of 1.2% during 1990–2000 and 1.1% during 
2000–2010. The Republic of Korea services industries, including finance, real estate, 
and business services as well as community and government services, have shown 
negative or zero growth of per worker value added over all subperiods. 
The lower productivity growth of the stagnant services sector relative to the 
manufacturing sector has been well known since the seminal study of Baumol (1967). 
Hence, the fact that the Republic of Korea services sector has had relatively lower 
productivity growth than the country’s manufacturing sector is not extraordinary. 
However, the differentials in labor productivity (i.e., per worker value added) and 
growth rates in labor productivity between the two sectors have been much larger in 
the Republic of Korea compared to other industrialized economies.  
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Table 6: Ratio of Each Sector’s per Worker Value Added  
to Manufacturing per Worker Value Added in 2010 
Industry 
Republic 
of Korea Japan 
People’s Republic 
of China 
United 
States 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and 
fishing 
0.24 0.22 0.18 0.55 
Manufacturing 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Services 0.48 0.94 0.64 0.64 
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels, 
and restaurants 
0.25 0.60 0.56 0.38 
Transport, storage, and 
communications 
0.61 1.00 1.06 0.83 
Finance, real estate, and business 
services 
0.83 1.55 1.79 1.25 
Community and government 
services 
0.47 0.84 0.31 0.48 
Others 0.74 0.95 0.83 0.82 
Mining and quarrying 1.99 1.14 1.82 2.44 
Electricity, gas, and water 3.64 6.41 2.70 2.90 
Construction 0.59 0.72 0.50 0.48 
Aggregate economy 0.58 0.91 0.58 0.68 
Notes: Japan uses 2009 values for 2010. For international comparison, the relative level of per worker value added is 
calculated using nominal value added. 
Sources: World KLEMS, http://www.worldklems.net; Asia KLEMS, http://asiaklems.net; and RIETI. China Industrial 
Productivity (CIP) 3.0 Database. http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database/CIP2015/index.html. 
Table 7: Growth Rate of per Worker Value Added by Sector 
(%) 
Industry 
1980–
1990 
1990–
2000 
2000–
2010 
1980–
2010 
Republic of Korea 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 7.02 5.58 4.73 5.78 
Manufacturing 7.58 9.94 5.47 7.66 
Services 2.45 1.22 1.13 1.60 
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and 
restaurants 
4.90 1.34 2.56 2.94 
Transport, storage, and communications 3.72 5.14 4.13 4.33 
Finance, real estate, and business services –0.55 –1.05 –1.37 –0.99 
Community and government services –0.20 –0.08 –1.06 –0.45 
Others 5.54 2.09 1.20 2.94 
Mining and quarrying 5.12 14.84 –2.07 5.96 
Electricity, gas, and water 11.40 10.08 3.20 8.23 
Construction 5.21 0.80 0.59 2.20 
Aggregate economy 5.54 4.14 2.56 4.08 
continued on next page 
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Table 7 continued 
Industry 
1980–
1990 
1990–
2000 
2000–
2010 
1980–
2010 
Japan 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 3.92 2.33 1.34 2.57 
Manufacturing 3.25 1.48 2.00 2.25 
Services 1.39 0.45 0.26 0.71 
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and 
restaurants 
2.02 1.41 –0.53 1.02 
Transport, storage, and communications 2.43 0.96 1.93 1.77 
Finance, real estate, and business services –0.09 0.05 –0.81 –0.27 
Community and government services 0.16 –0.61 0.47 –0.01 
Others 2.91 –2.30 0.66 0.42 
Mining and quarrying 1.94 –0.42 –1.98 –0.09 
Electricity, gas, and water 6.16 2.69 2.39 3.79 
Construction 2.53 –3.41 0.37 –0.19 
Aggregate economy 2.43 0.63 0.72 1.28 
People’s Republic of China 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 2.34 2.73 4.14 3.09 
Manufacturing 10.64 19.51 14.54 15.04 
Services –0.70 –1.33 5.78 1.32 
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and 
restaurants 
–16.02 –2.76 8.64 –2.95 
Transport, storage, and communications 0.87 4.83 11.22 5.80 
Finance, real estate, and business services 11.02 3.41 –3.00 3.56 
Community and government services –2.35 –8.90 2.63 –2.89 
Others –1.31 –0.19 4.78 1.17 
Mining and quarrying –3.65 6.39 1.43 1.56 
Electricity, gas, and water 6.63 –8.75 12.46 3.34 
Construction –3.87 –1.93 3.38 –0.70 
Aggregate economy 4.72 7.25 9.94 7.39 
United States 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 8.67 3.33 2.54 4.85 
Manufacturing 4.07 4.82 4.12 4.34 
Services 0.34 1.16 1.32 0.94 
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and 
restaurants 
3.29 3.76 1.29 2.78 
Transport, storage, and communications 1.40 2.09 3.59 2.36 
Finance, real estate, and business services –1.56 0.78 2.32 0.51 
Community and government services –0.12 –0.36 0.01 –0.15 
Others 0.24 –0.73 –1.25 –0.58 
Mining and quarrying 6.36 1.67 –3.46 1.52 
Electricity, gas, and water –0.26 1.26 2.08 1.03 
Construction –0.55 –0.45 –3.03 –1.34 
Aggregate economy 0.98 1.45 1.33 1.25 
Notes: Data from the People’s Republic of China are from 1981 to 2010, and data from Japan are from 1980 to 2009. 
Sources: World KLEMS, http://www.worldklems.net; Asia KLEMS, http://asiaklems.net; and RIETI. China Industrial 
Productivity (CIP) 3.0 Database. http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database/CIP2015/index.html. 
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Figure 6: Sector Shares of Employment, 1980–2010 
(%) 
 
 
 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on sector employment data from World KLEMS, http://www.worldklems.net;  
Asia KLEMS, http://asiaklems.net; and RIETI. China Industrial Productivity (CIP) 3.0 Database. http://www.rieti.go.jp/ 
en/database/CIP2015/index.html. GDP data are from Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015). 
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Figure 6 confirms the stylized pattern of structural change in the literature. 13  An 
increase in GDP per capita is associated with a decrease in agriculture employment 
and an increase in employment in the services sector. The manufacturing employment 
share shows hump-shaped changes. The PRC has been following the stylized pattern, 
although it had a larger share of employment in the agriculture sector and a smaller 
share in the manufacturing sector in 2010, compared to the Republic of Korea and 
Japan in the 1980s.  
It is clear that there have been major employment shifts toward the services sector in 
selected Asian economies over 1980–2010. In the Republic of Korea, the share of 
employment in the services sector increased dramatically from 37.0% in 1980 to 67.5% 
over 1980–2010. This share increased in Japan from 53.1% to 70.2% over the same 
period. In the PRC, the employment share of the services sector increased over the 
same period from 16.4% to 39.3%.   
The low labor productivity of the services sector relative to the manufacturing sector 
tends to hamper overall productivity growth. Lee and McKibbin (2014) showed a 
negative relationship between the overall labor productivity growth rate of an economy 
and the employment share of its services sector. 
A key to the Republic of Korea’s further growth is to rebalance its economy through 
diversification of growth sources. A new growth strategy should entail productivity 
increases in services industries. Structural reforms to stimulate productivity growth in 
the services sector are essential for sustained long-term growth. One of the effective 
ways to raise productivity is developing modern services industries, including health 
care, education, telecommunications, business processing, and legal and financial 
services (Eichengreen and Gupta 2013). Lowering product regulations and barriers to 
foreign direct investment would promote more competition and boost new technology 
innovation. Enhancing services sector productivity is important for the Republic of 
Korea to obtain a second growth driver that could propel strong, sustainable growth in 
the future. 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA’S SUSTAINED GROWTH 
As discussed, the Republic of Korea economy, like those of other developing countries, 
started its conditional convergence and catch-up process with low initial per worker 
output relative to its own long-run (or steady-state) potential, which provided the 
opportunity for faster capital accumulation and technology diffusion. Good 
environmental and policy factors, such as a high investment rate, strong human capital, 
trade openness, and improved institutions, guided the economy toward a higher level 
of long-run steady state compared to other economies, enabling the Republic of Korea 
to realize its strong potential for catching up. For this successful catch-up, the Republic 
of Korea’s manufacturing- and export-oriented growth strategy played a critical role. 
International trade provided large external markets for Republic of Korea products and 
facilitated imitation and adoption of advanced technologies. Continuous product 
diversification and technology upgrading in the manufacturing sector also characterized 
the Republic of Korea’s economic development. 
  
13 See Chenery (1960); Herrendorf, Rogerson, Valentinyi (2014); and Lee and McKibbin (2014). 
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The PRC economy has also grown fast over the last 35 years, as it transformed from a 
controlled socialist economy to a market-oriented economy. During this period, the 
PRC has shown strong output growth, which averaged more than 9.5% annually, and 
rapidly narrowed its per capita income gap with the Republic of Korea, Japan, and US. 
Its unprecedented economic growth since the 1980s reflects a strong convergence 
effect fueled by economic reform and opening. In addition, abundant human resources, 
high savings and investment rates, and prudent macroeconomic management have 
contributed to the strong growth. The PRC’s economic power continues to rise, making 
it the largest economy in the world. Its share of world GDP in PPP terms is projected to 
reach about 17% in 2015, exceeding that of the US and European Union (IMF 2015). 
Advancing from upper middle-income to high-income status, the PRC now strives to 
develop more technologically sophisticated industries.  
Although its economy has grown rapidly and its per capita income gap has diminished, 
the PRC showed increasing average growth rates until recent years. This acceleration 
of economic growth in the takeoff stage of development also occurred in the Republic 
of Korea until 1990 and in Japan until 1970 (Figure 2). The PRC caught up fast to the 
US in terms of per worker output and per capita income. In 1980, the value of per 
worker output in the PRC remained only 6% that of the US, which rose to 17% in 2010. 
Although the PRC has caught up to advanced economies very fast, a significant 
development gap still exists between the PRC and advanced economies. The PRC’s 
average per capita income level relative to the US in 2010–2014 is lower than the 
Republic of Korea’s level in 1990 and Japan’s level in 1970.  
Physical capital accumulation has contributed most significantly to the PRC’s catch-up 
process, as it did for the Republic of Korea. The level of physical capital stock per 
worker in the PRC relative to that of the US increased significantly from 3% in 1970 to 
20% in 2010. By contrast, the relative level of productivity increased at a modest rate 
from 39% to 44% of the US over the same period. Because the current levels of 
physical capital accumulation, human capital stock, and TFP relative to the US are 
comparable to the Republic of Korea’s levels in the 1970s and 1980s, the PRC must 
have significant room to catch up to the US in per worker output by increasing factor 
accumulation and productivity growth. Economic growth can remain strong; however, it 
will eventually decelerate.     
In fact, the PRC economy is currently experiencing a slowdown. The PRC recorded a 
6.9% GDP growth rate in 2015, the slowest since 1990, and it is expected to continue 
slowing. The International Monetary Fund (2016) forecasted a growth rate of 6.3% in 
2016 and 6.0% in 2017. The reduced return on investment has lowered physical capital 
accumulation, as it cannot continue to maintain the unprecedented level of investment 
ratio over 45%. In addition, labor inputs have dropped due to fertility decline and 
population aging. With limited institutional and innovative capability, the PRC is 
struggling to maintain strong technological progress.  
For the PRC to continue catching up and to achieve a level of development 
comparable with that in the Republic of Korea, Japan, or US, a faster growth rate is 
required in the coming decades, which is why it is important for the PRC to learn from 
the early development experiences of the Republic of Korea. In particular, the PRC’s 
growth strategy over the next 2 decades should be designed by analyzing the 
experiences of the Republic of Korea’s economy and learning from its successes and 
failures. Specifically, understanding the role of convergence, technology, institutions, 
and the manufacturing and services sectors in driving sustained economic growth 
could help guide PRC economic policies. 
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Forecasting the PRC’s mid- and long-term growth is a debate among scholars and 
policy makers.14 The discussion focuses mostly on interpreting the country’s growth 
experience in a global and historical context. For instance, Pritchett and Summers 
(2014) argued that the PRC’s growth could slow to 2%–4% over the next 2 decades, as 
the PRC will probably succumb to the historically prevalent growth pattern of 
“regression to the mean.” One critical assumption of this view is that the PRC will follow 
the average pattern of historical experiences across all of the world’s economies. On 
the other hand, Lin (2015) suggested that the PRC has the potential to grow 8% for 
another 20 years by rapidly narrowing its technology and per capita income gap with 
those of the US through technological imitation and adaptation through leveraging a 
“latecomer advantage.” 
Based on the experience of the Republic of Korea as well as a broad sample of 
countries over time, a decline of the PRC’s growth potential seems inevitable due to 
the diminishing pace of convergence. If the estimated convergence effect from the 
cross-country regression prevails, the PRC’s per worker GDP growth is expected to 
decline by 1.6 to 2.4 percentage points when its per worker GDP doubles. The PRC’s 
per worker GDP growth rate was 8.5% over 2000–2010, raising per worker GDP by 
about 2.26 times over the period. Hence, the convergence effect implies that a smaller 
per worker GDP gap would lower the per worker GDP growth rate to 5.7%–6.6% in 
2010–2020, assuming other environmental and policy variables remain unchanged. 
Since the working-age population growth rate is estimated to be –0.1% in 2010–2020, 
the GDP growth rate would also decline to 5.6%–6.5%. The PRC’s per capita GDP 
growth rate would decline further to 5.0%–5.9% by considering its total population 
growth of 0.6% during 2010–2020.  
The PRC’s actual per worker GDP growth rate is estimated to be about 7.3% between 
2010 and 2015, exceeding the growth estimate. However, the increase in per worker 
GDP level over the previous 5 years will exert downward pressure on output growth in 
the coming years. Table 5 shows that the working-age population growth rate will 
decline from –0.1% in 2010–2020 to –0.3% in 2020–2030. Both the convergence effect 
and working-age population decline would cause a slowdown of GDP growth in the 
coming decade. It would be difficult for the PRC to maintain over 6% for GDP growth in 
the coming decade without significant improvements in institutions and policy factors.  
These forecasts are broadly consistent with views that predict a “soft landing” of the 
PRC economy (e.g., Lee and Hong 2012, World Bank 2013, Cai and Lu 2013, Perkins 
2015). Lee and Hong (2012) predicted that the PRC’s average potential per worker 
GDP growth would decline to about 6.1% over 2011–2020 and 5.0% over 2021–2030 
under the baseline scenario, which assumes a steady improvement in human capital 
but no serious policy and institutional reform. This prediction was based on the 
conditional convergence framework using cross-country growth regression analysis, in 
which physical capital accumulation, human capital accumulation, and TFP growth  
are estimated separately and then combined to produce long-run GDP forecasts. In 
addition, this study showed considerable growth gains of policy reforms in the 
alternative scenario: when the PRC significantly improves education, research and 
development stock growth, and maintenance of rule of law, the PRC could achieve 
average potential per worker GDP growth of about 7.0% over 2011–2020 and 6.2% 
over 2021–2030. 
 
14 The discussion in this paragraph is from Lee (2015). 
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There are significant gaps in human capital and quality of institutions between the PRC 
and advanced economies (Appendix), indicating that the PRC could stimulate 
economic growth by more educational investment and institutional reform. The 
government has been carrying out structural reforms aimed at labor market flexibility 
and human capital development, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and 
liberalization of the finance sector. The success of these reforms will improve 
environmental and policy variables and support productivity growth, thereby offsetting 
the convergence effect. 
In addition, the future of the PRC’s growth hinges on policies to promote continuous 
technological innovation and industrial upgrading, which could contribute to  
productivity increases in both the manufacturing and services sectors. Increased 
research and development investment and its more efficient allocation could also 
stimulate productivity growth.15 Policies aimed at strengthening the research capacity 
of domestic firms and protection of intellectual property rights could stimulate 
innovative activities.  
PRC authorities are pushing on with rebalancing from an investment and export-driven 
economy to a domestic consumption and services-based economy. Effective 
rebalancing is critical to move the economy to a sustainable growth path, especially 
under great uncertainties in the global economy. Due to its bigger size, the PRC will 
have more challenges maintaining its export-led growth than the Republic of Korea. 
However, premature switching from exports to the domestic sector may hamper overall 
productivity growth. Reallocating resources from a productive export-oriented industry 
to a highly unproductive services industry could cause a permanent decline in the 
economy’s productivity (Kim, Lee, McKibbin 2014; Lee 2015).  
There are significant gaps in the labor productivity level and growth between the 
manufacturing and services sectors in the PRC. The average annual growth in per 
worker value added in the services sector was only 1.3% per year for 1980–2010, 
which is significantly lower than the manufacturing sector’s 15.0%. The annual growth 
rates in per worker value added increased to 5.8% during 2000–2010 from an annual 
average of –0.7% during 1981–1990 and –1.3% during 1990–2000. PRC services 
industries—in particular the wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and restaurants industry 
and the transport, storage, and communications services industry—showed strong, 
positive growth of per worker value added in the recent decade. However, the finance, 
real estate, and business services industry showed negative growth. Sector data are 
subject to measurement errors because of data constraint at industry level. As 
discussed by Maddison (2007) and Wu (2014), the official GDP estimates for the 
“nonmaterial services” are highly likely to be exaggerated. 
Hence, the PRC should pursue successful rebalancing along with improved 
productivity growth. Rebalancing policies alone are unlikely to increase average output 
growth substantially in the PRC. Enhancing productivity is critical for achieving higher 
economic growth over the long run (Kim, Lee, McKibbin 2014). The PRC’s growth 
strategy over the next 2 decades still necessitates continuous upgrading in 
manufacturing and export industries while improving domestic services industries. 
Improving productivity and achieving more balanced growth will require careful  
long-term strategies. 
 
15 According to OECD (2014b), gross domestic expenditure on research and development in 2012 was 
$257 billion in the PRC. It predicted that the PRC will be the world’s top research and development 
spender by around 2019. 
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The government has implemented structural change and growth-enhancing polices in 
gradual and pragmatic ways (Naughton 2007). It has started with rural reform using  
a dual-track strategy. Markets were first opened in some selected coastal areas and 
then expanded to other areas. In addition, the government has adopted incremental 
managerial reform instead of rapid privatization of state-owned enterprises. At a later 
stage, the government ended its dual-track strategy and adopted more rapid 
restructuring and downsizing of state-owned enterprises. The economy has made a 
successful transition from a command economy to a market economy while achieving 
rapid economic growth. In addition, the PRC has maintained macroeconomic stability 
as well as political and social stability. 
Currently, the PRC faces difficult challenges to continue its reforms. It needs to 
continue reforms in the factor markets of labor, finance, and land. Furthermore, it must 
continue to restructure state-owned enterprises and increase domestic competition, 
especially in the services sector by overcoming pressures from vested interest groups. 
Yao (2013) asserted that the country’s authoritarian government was able to adopt the 
right growth-enhancing polices at critical points because it was not unduly swayed by 
any interest group. It is unclear whether the authoritarian regime can continue to 
maintain its neutrality and perform better than other regimes. Since the economy has 
become bigger and more unpredictable, government interventions would probably not 
work as they did before. Furthermore, the rise of the middle class will likely promote 
political development, particularly democracy, which could lead the population to push 
for government focus on social welfare policies, which are important but do not 
necessarily enhance growth. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The recent growth slowdown of the Republic of Korea’s economy reflects its 
diminishing mid- and long-term growth potential due to convergence and structural 
factors. As argued by the convergence theory, a fast-growing country eventually grows 
more slowly, encountering difficulties in maintaining the same fast rates of human and 
physical capital accumulation and technological progress.  
The Republic of Korea’s recent growth slowdown is also attributable to its unbalanced 
economic structure. Export-oriented policies have caused the Republic of Korea to 
depend overly on manufacturing exports for growth. Increased imbalance between  
the manufacturing and services sectors hampers the productivity growth of the overall 
economy. Due to its low productivity growth, the contribution of the services sector to 
overall economic growth is small, despite its increasing size. Moreover, owing to 
overdependence on external demand, the Republic of Korea’s economy has become 
prone to risk from global economic cycles, as demonstrated by its experience during 
the recent global financial crisis. External demand may not assure the Republic  
of Korea of a continued market for its exports in the post-crisis global environment,  
in which the recovery of advanced economies remains sluggish and the PRC 
economy—the Republic of Korea’s largest trading partner—begins to slow rapidly. The 
Republic of Korea needs structural reforms and productivity growth, particularly in its 
services sector, for more balanced and sustained growth.  
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Like the Republic of Korea, the PRC’s economic slowdown is an inevitable trend,  
partly an outcome of its earlier success. The PRC has narrowed its income gap 
continuously from its long-run potential over time; according to the prediction of 
conditional convergence, economies with higher initial income can expect slower 
growth. The PRC’s average potential GDP growth will decline to 5%–6% over the 
coming decade, unless it significantly improves institutions and policy factors. The 
slowdown could be accelerated if policy makers make major mistakes in handling 
domestic weaknesses and political transformation. 
The data indicate that the Republic of Korea and PRC have had more favorable 
conditions for rapid growth than other developing countries by maintaining strong 
investment, high trade openness, and macroeconomic stability, and by improving the 
quality of human resources and institutions continuously. The future of economic 
growth in the Republic of Korea and PRC hinges critically on reforms and policies that 
could contribute to increasing productivity, at least partially offsetting the growth 
deceleration due to convergence in the coming decades. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A: Summary of Key Variables for the World, People’s Republic of China, 
Japan, Republic of Korea, and United States, 1965–1970 and 2005–2010 
 
Republic 
of Korea Japan 
People’s 
Republic 
of China 
United 
States World 
1965–1970 
Per worker GDP growth  0.072 0.090 0.015 0.018 0.032 
Per worker GDP in 1965 2,354 10,626 1,721 30,046 8,977 
Investment/GDP 0.237 0.317 0.153 0.208 0.191 
Fertility rate in 1965 5.157 2.139 5.872 2.913 5.173 
Schooling in 1965 5.676 7.796 3.400 10.416 4.108 
Life expectancy in 1965 56.82 70.20 51.29 70.22 58.17 
Trade openness 0.165 0.186 0.018 0.096 0.363 
Government consumption  0.147 0.162 0.164 0.143 0.166 
Rule of law index 0.500 1.000 0.500 1.000 0.576 
Inflation 0.117 0.053 0.040 0.042 0.062 
Democracy index 0.474 0.951 0.117 0.946 0.643 
Terms of trade 0.002 –0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
2005–2010  
Per worker GDP growth 0.029 0.010 0.095 –0.002 0.019 
Per worker GDP in 2005 34,012 46,378 8,059 64,366 23,361 
Investment/GDP 0.345 0.244 0.394 0.212 0.227 
Fertility rate in 2005 1.076 1.260 1.668 2.054 2.771 
Schooling in 2005 12.272 12.124 8.020 13.011 8.531 
Life expectancy in 2005 78.43 81.93 72.17 77.34 70.45 
Trade openness 0.722 0.374 0.312 0.283 0.662 
Government consumption 0.128 0.171 0.217 0.113 0.174 
Rule of law index 0.833 0.833 0.750 0.833 0.642 
Inflation 0.030 –0.001 0.029 0.022 0.051 
Democracy index 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.738 
Terms of trade –0.032 –0.009 –0.001 0.001 0.006 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Notes: For the world, the figures are unweighted averages of the sample of the 75 economies that are used in the 
regressions in Table 3. See the notes to Table 3. 
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